arXiv:cs.AI· Qikun Cai, Tao Huang, Chen Hou·· 22 小时前
面向邮件生成 LLM 智能体的低成本隐私执行:Gemma 本地改写 + PrivacyChecker
Cost-Efficient Privacy Enforcement for Email-Generating LLM Agents under Strategic Information Requests
AI 导读
研究提出“本地契约条件改写”方案,为邮件生成 LLM 智能体在发出草稿前拦截内容、构建信息释放契约,并用本地 Gemma 改写、必要时才调用 PrivacyChecker。
正文
Abstract:LLM agents now act as delegated communication intermediaries: they read private context, draft messages, and send externally visible emails on behalf of a user. Existing checker-repair defenses can reduce inappropriate disclosure, but they rely on repeated calls to a remote action LLM (the model that drafts and repairs the email) and a remote checker LLM whenever a draft fails validation. This creates a cost problem as well as a privacy problem, especially when a requester strategically asks for exact values, raw records, source evidence, or other details that induce leakage-heavy drafts. We propose local contract-conditioned rewriting as a cost-efficient enforcement layer for email-generating agents. The mechanism intercepts an outgoing draft, constructs an information-release contract that specifies what to preserve, generalize, and forbid, rewrites the draft with a local Gemma rewriter, and selectively invokes a final PrivacyChecker. Across extensive email tasks under normal prompts and attack prompts that operationalize strategic information requests, Gemma + Checker reduces normal-prompt leakage from 11.41% to 4.03% while improving UsableRate (satisfied or partially satisfied outputs) from 85.2% to 92.6%. Under the strategic attack-prompt condition, it reduces leakage from 28.19% to 18.79% and reduces checker-only cost amplification from 1.32x to 1.02x. Offline replay ablation shows that the full contract reduces leakage relative to generic Gemma rewriting by 36.3% under normal prompts and 54.1% under attack prompts. These results support a local-first privacy enforcement design: move repair to a cheaper trusted local layer when possible, but retain the checker as the final semantic gate for high-risk sends.
| Comments: | 24 pages |
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2610.18007 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2610.18007v1 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.18007 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Tao Huang [view email]
[v1]
Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:06:12 UTC (1,222 KB)
来源:arXiv:cs.AI · arxiv.org