Agent-Canary-Mas：长时程多智能体系统中的协议风险端到端评估

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Abstract:Agent-to-agent protocols allow LLM agents to discover peers, exchange results, and coordinate tool use. A locally successful protocol attack, however, may be rejected by a later agent or propagated into a consequential task decision. Measuring local exploitability alone leaves this difference unresolved and provides limited evidence about which participant caused the final outcome.
We present Agent-Canary-Mas, an end-to-end evaluation system that follows protocol risk through long-horizon multi-agent tasks. It covers five risk classes and 13 subclasses across A2A, ANP, and BCS, with 975 matched malicious--benign task pairs in five business domains. A shared OpenClaw framework runs autonomous, tool-using agents under different underlying models while preserving the task and execution setup. Matched runs separate local protocol success from downstream consequences; retained evidence connects participant selection, message consumption, tool activity, and task-state changes. We further evaluate a protocol-context Guard that checks an object's authority at consequential handoffs.
Across three model conditions, local attack success is frequently at or above 90%, while consequence conversion ranges from 7.1% to 100.0%. Cross-agent evidence raises macro-averaged Audit-F1 from 29.7% to 95.5%. On Finance tasks, the Guard lowers average ASR from 86.1% to 53.8% and PTCR from 65.5% to 31.2%, with a measurable completion tradeoff. These results show that protocol risk depends on how agents use exchanged objects throughout the task, and that evaluating this path supports more informative risk assessment, attribution, and defense.

Submission history

From: Zhiyuan Chang [view email]
[v1] Sun, 11 Oct 2026 11:02:00 UTC (8,484 KB)
[v2] Wed, 14 Oct 2026 10:06:32 UTC (8,484 KB)