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arXiv:cs.AI· Fasheng Miao, Zhaoyu Hu, Xiang Li, Changqing An, Jiutian Zeng, Longtao Huang, Haixin Duan, Jilong Wang·· 22 小时前

ProtoArena:AI 智能体能否发现并利用真实世界跨组件协议漏洞?

ProtoArena: Can AI Agents Discover and Exploit Real-World Cross-Component Protocol Vulnerabilities?

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ProtoArena 是一个黑盒、多组件动态基准,包含 80 个跨组件漏洞利用环境,覆盖 11 个协议与应用领域和 7 类攻击。评测中 Claude Opus 4.8 成功率最高,L1 引导下为 48.8%,效果导向的黑盒 L3 下仅 12.5%。在 DNSBomb 优化实验中,其峰值下游响应与平均查询输入字节率之比超过 171,000 倍。

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Abstract:Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for vulnerability analysis, yet existing benchmarks provide limited coverage of exploitation that depends on interactions among network protocol components. Such vulnerabilities arise from inconsistencies in message interpretation, timing, state, or trust assumptions across participants. We introduce ProtoArena, a black-box, multi-component, dynamic benchmark with 80 cross-component vulnerability-exploitation environments spanning 11 protocol and application domains and 7 attack categories. Tasks are primarily informed by published protocol-attack mechanisms. Agents interact with running systems through scoped interfaces to achieve security-effect objectives without target source code. Three information levels assess guided reproduction, exploitation with mechanism and topology context, and effect-directed black-box exploration. A hybrid verifier combines rule-based checks with LLM review of independently collected traffic and logs. We evaluate five LLMs. Claude Opus 4.8 achieves the highest observed success rates: 48.8% under L1 guidance and 12.5% under effect-directed black-box L3. In a separate DNSBomb optimization experiment, it achieves a peak downstream-response to average query-input byte-rate ratio exceeding 171,000 times. The results show that agents can achieve verifiable exploitation effects in some cross-component environments, but success with limited black-box information remains low and varies across domains and attack categories. All experiments use controlled, explicitly authorized targets; they do not test production systems or disclose previously unknown vulnerabilities.
Comments: 18 pages, 5 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2610.17837 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2610.17837v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.17837

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Fasheng Miao [view email]
[v1] Tue, 13 Oct 2026 06:56:32 UTC (2,420 KB)

来源:arXiv:cs.AI · arxiv.org